While Conti is considered a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model ransomware variant, there is variation in its structure that differentiates it from a typical affiliate model. It is likely that Conti developers pay the deployer’s of the ransomware a wage rather than a percentage of the proceeds from a successful attack.
Conti actors often gain initial access [TA0001] to networks through:
- Spearphishing campaigns using tailored emails that contain malicious attachments  or malicious links [T1566.002];
- Malicious Word attachments often contain embedded scripts that can be used to download or drop other malware—such as TrickBot and IcedID, and/or Cobalt Strike— to assist with lateral movement and later stages of the attack life cycle with the eventual goal of deploying Conti ransomware.,,
- Stolen or weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials [T1078];
- Phone calls;
- Fake software promoted via search engine optimization;
- Other malware distribution networks (e.g., ZLoader); and
- Common vulnerabilities in external
In the execution phase [TA0002], actors run a getuid payload before using a more aggressive payload to reduce the risk of triggering antivirus engines. CISA and FBI have observed Conti actors using Router Scan, a penetration testing tool, to maliciously scan for and brute force [T1110] routers, cameras, and network-attached storage devices with web interfaces. Additionally, actors use Kerberos attacks [T1558.003] to attempt to get the Admin hash to conduct brute force attacks.
Conti actors are known to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management software and remote desktop software as backdoors to maintain persistence [TA0003] on victim networks. The actors use tools already available on the victim network—and, as needed, add additional tools such as Windows Sysinternals and Mimikatz—to obtain users’ hashes and clear-text credentials, which enable the actors to escalate privileges [TA0004] within a domain and perform other post-exploitation and lateral movement tasks [TA0008]. In some cases, the actors also use TrickBot malware to carry out post-exploitation tasks.
According to a recently leaked threat actor “playbook,” Conti actors also exploit vulnerabilities in unpatched assets, such as the following, to escalate privileges [TA0004] and move laterally [TA0008] across a victim’s network:
- 2017 Microsoft Windows Server Message Block 0 server vulnerabilities;
- “PrintNightmare” vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527) in Windows Print spooler service; and
- “Zerologon” vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) in Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller 
Artifacts leaked with the playbook identify four Cobalt Strike server Internet Protocol (IP) addresses Conti actors previously used to communicate with their command and control (C2) server.
CISA and FBI have observed Conti actors using different Cobalt Strike server IP addresses unique to different victims. Conti actors often use the open-source Rclone command line program for data exfiltration [TA0010]. After the actors steal and encrypt the victim’s sensitive data [T1486], they employ a double extortion technique in which they demand the victim pay a ransom for the release of the encrypted data and threaten the victim with public release of the data if the ransom is not paid.
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
Conti ransomware uses the ATT&CK techniques listed in table 1.
Table 1: Conti ATT&CK techniques for enterprise
|Valid Accounts||T1078||Conti actors have been observed gaining unauthorized access to victim networks through stolen Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials.|
|Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment||T1566.001||Conti ransomware can be delivered using TrickBot malware, which is known to use an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware.|
|Phishing: Spearphishing Link||T1566.002||Conti ransomware can be delivered using TrickBot, which has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails.|
|Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows
|T1059.003||Conti ransomware can utilize command line options to allow an attacker control over how it scans and encrypts files.|
Programming Interface (API)
|T1106||Conti ransomware has used API calls during execution.|
|Valid Accounts||T1078||Conti actors have been observed gaining unauthorized access to victim networks through stolen RDP credentials.|
|External Remote Services||T1133||Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as virtual private networks (VPNs), Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.|
|Process Injection: Dynamic- link Library Injection||Conti ransomware has loaded an encrypted dynamic-link library (DLL) into memory and then executes it.|
|Obfuscated Files or Information||T1027||Conti ransomware has encrypted DLLs and used obfuscation to hide Windows API calls.|
|Process Injection: Dynamic- link Library Injection||T1055.001||Conti ransomware has loaded an encrypted DLL into memory and then executes it.|
|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information||T1140||Conti ransomware has decrypted its payload using a hardcoded AES-256 key.|
|Brute Force||T1110||Conti actors use legitimate tools to maliciously scan for and brute force routers, cameras, and network-attached storage devices with web
|Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting||T1558.003||Conti actors use Kerberos attacks to attempt to get the Admin hash.|
|System Network Configuration Discovery||T1016||Conti ransomware can retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using the GetIpNetTable() API call and check to ensure IP addresses it connects to are for local, non-internet systems.|
|System Network Connections Discovery||T1049||Conti ransomware can enumerate routine network connections from a compromised host.|
|Process Discovery||T1057||Conti ransomware can enumerate through all open processes to search for any that have the string sql in their process name.|
|File and Directory Discovery||T1083||Conti ransomware can discover files on a local system.|
|Network Share Discovery||T1135||Conti ransomware can enumerate remote open server message block (SMB) network shares using NetShareEnum().|
|Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares||T1021.002||Conti ransomware can spread via SMB and encrypts files on different hosts, potentially compromising an entire network.|
|Taint Shared Content||T1080||Conti ransomware can spread itself by infecting other remote machines via network shared drives.|
|Data Encrypted for Impact||Conti ransomware can use CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for each victim. Conti ransomware can use “Windows Restart Manager” to ensure files are unlocked and open for encryption.|
|Service Stop||T1489||Conti ransomware can stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of net stop.|
|Inhibit System Recovery||T1490||Conti ransomware can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.|
Fortify 24×7 recommends that network defenders apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise by Conti ransomware attacks.
Use multi-factor authentication.
- Require multi-factor authentication to remotely access networks from external
Implement network segmentation and filter traffic.
- Implement and ensure robust network segmentation between networks and functions to reduce the spread of the Define a demilitarized zone that eliminates unregulated communication between networks.
- Filter network traffic to prohibit ingress and egress communications with known malicious IP
- Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users. Implement a user training program to discourage users from visiting malicious websites or opening malicious attachments. Filter emails containing executable files to prevent them from reaching end
- Implement a URL blocklist and/or allowlist to prevent users from accessing malicious
Scan for vulnerabilities and keep software updated.
- Set antivirus/antimalware programs to conduct regular scans of network assets using up-to- date
- Upgrade software and operating systems, applications, and firmware on network assets in a timely Consider using a centralized patch management system.
Remove unnecessary applications and apply controls.
- Remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. Conti threat actors leverage legitimate applications—such as remote monitoring and management software and remote desktop software applications—to aid in the malicious exploitation of an organization’s
- Investigate any unauthorized software, particularly remote desktop or remote monitoring and management
- Implement application allowlisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known and permitted by the organization’s security policy. Implement software restriction policies (SRPs) or other controls to prevent programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary folders supporting popular internet browsers or compression/decompression
- Implement execution prevention by disabling macro scripts from Microsoft Office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full Microsoft Office suite
Implement endpoint and detection response tools.
- Endpoint and detection response tools allow a high degree of visibility into the security status of endpoints and can help effectively protect against malicious cyber
Limit access to resources over the network, especially by restricting RDP.
- After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require multi-factor authentication.
Secure user accounts.
- Regularly audit administrative user accounts and configure access controls under the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.
- Regularly audit logs to ensure new accounts are legitimate
Use the Ransomware Response Checklist in case of infection.
If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization, CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend the following actions:
- Follow the Ransomware Response Checklist on 11 of the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
- Scan your If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware.
- Report incidents immediately to CISA at https://us-cert.cisa.gov/report, a local FBI Field Office, or S. Secret Service Field Office.
- Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Fortify 24×7 strongly discourages paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or may fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered.
- MITRE ATT&CK: Conti
- MITRE ATT&CK: TrickBot  MITRE ATT&CK: IcedID
- FBI FLASH: Conti Ransomware Attacks Impact Healthcare and First Responder Networks
- Ransomware Daily: Conti Ransomware Gang Playbook Mentions MSP Software – ChannelE2E
- Cisco Talos blog: Translated: Talos’ insights from the recently leaked Conti ransomware playbook
- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 – Critical: Security Update for Microsoft Windows SMB Server
- Microsoft Security Update: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability – CVE- 2021-34527
- Microsoft Security Update: Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2020-1472