BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware IOCs

Fortify Security Team
Apr 22, 2022

As of March 2022, BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware as a service (RaaS) had compromised at least 60 entities worldwide and is the first ransomware group to do so successfully using RUST, considered to be a more secure programming language that offers improved performance and reliable concurrent processing. BlackCat-affiliated threat actors typically request ransom payments of several million dollars in Bitcoin and Monero but have accepted ransom payments below the initial ransom demand amount. Many of the developers and money launderers for BlackCat/ALPHV are linked to
Darkside/Blackmatter, indicating they have extensive networks and experience with ransomware operations.

Technical Details

BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware leverages previously compromised user credentials to gain initial access to the victim system. Once the malware establishes access, it compromises Active Directory user and administrator accounts. The malware uses Windows Task Scheduler to configure malicious Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy ransomware. Initial deployment of the malware leverages PowerShell scripts, in conjunction with Cobalt Strike, and disables security features within the victim’s network. BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware also leverages Windows administrative tools and Microsoft Sysinternals tools during compromise.

BlackCat/ALPHV steals victim data prior to the execution of the ransomware, including from cloud providers where company or client data was stored.

The actors leverage Windows scripting to deploy ransomware and to compromise additional hosts. For example, the following batch and PowerShell scripts were observed:

  • start.bat – launches the ransomware executable with required arguments
  • est.bat – copies the ransomware to other locations
  • drag-and-drop-target.bat – launches the ransomware executable for the MySQL Server
  • run.bat – executes a callout command to an external server using SSH – file names may change depending on the company and systems affected
  • Runs1.ps1 – PowerShell script to disable McAfee


The following are characteristics of compromise by BlackCat/ALPHV, as of mid-February 2022:

PowerShell Scripts
Filename MD5 Hash
amd – Copy.ps1 861738dd15eb7fb50568f0e39a69e107
ipscan.ps1 9f60dd752e7692a2f5c758de4eab3e6f
Run1.ps1 09bc47d7bc5e40d40d9729cec5e39d73
Additional PowerShell Filenames
[###].ps1 CME.ps1
[#].ps1 Run1.ps1
mim.ps1 [##].ps1
psexec.ps1 Systems.ps1


Batch Scripts
Filename MD5 Hash
CheckVuln.bat f5ef5142f044b94ac5010fd883c09aa7
Create-share-RunAsAdmin.bat 84e3b5fe3863d25bb72e25b10760e861
LPE-Exploit-RunAsUser.bat 9f2309285e8a8471fce7330fcade8619
RCE-Exploit-RunAsUser.bat 6c6c46bdac6713c94debbd454d34efd9
est.bat e7ee8ea6fb7530d1d904cdb2d9745899
runav.bat 815bb1b0c5f0f35f064c55a1b640fca5


Executables and DLLs
Filename MD5 Hash
http_x64.exe 6c2874169fdfb30846fe7ffe34635bdb
spider.dll 20855475d20d252dda21287264a6d860
spider_32.dll 82db4c04f5dcda3bfcd75357adf98228
powershell.dll fcf3a6eeb9f836315954dae03459716d
rpcdump.exe 91625f7f5d590534949ebe08cc728380
Filename SHA1 Hash
mimikatz.exe d241df7b9d2ec0b8194751cd5ce153e27cc40fa4
run.exe 4831c1b113df21360ef68c450b5fca278d08fae2
zakrep_plink.exe fce13da5592e9e120777d82d27e06ed2b44918cf
beacon.exe 3f85f03d33b9fe25bcfac611182da4ab7f06a442
win1999.exe 37178dfaccbc371a04133d26a55127cf4d4382f8
[compromised company].exe 1b2a30776df64fbd7299bd588e21573891dcecbe
Additional Observed Filenames
test.exe xxx.exe
Mim.exe xxxw.exe
crackmapexec.exe Services.exe
plink.exe Systems.exe


BlackCat Ransomware SHA256 Hashes:


C2 IPs:  


Recommended Mitigations:

Fortify 24×7 does not encourage paying ransoms. Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered. It may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. However, when victims are faced with an inability to function, all options are evaluated to protect shareholders, employees and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, Fortify 24×7 urges you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office. Doing so provides the FBI with critical information needed to prevent future attacks by identifying and tracking ransomware attackers and holding them accountable under US law.

  • Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts.
  • Regularly back up data, air gap, and password protect backup copies Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where the data resides.
  • Review Task Scheduler for unrecognized scheduled Additionally, manually review operating system defined or recognized scheduled tasks for unrecognized “actions” (for example: review the steps each scheduled task is expected to perform).
  • Review antivirus logs for indications they were unexpectedly turned off.
  • Implement network segmentation.
  • Require administrator credentials to install software.
  • Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
  • Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released.
  • Use multifactor authentication where possible.
  • Regularly change passwords to network systems and accounts, and avoid reusing passwords for different accounts.
  • Implement the shortest acceptable timeframe for password changes.
  • Disable unused remote access/Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports and monitor remote access/RDP logs.
  • Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.
  • Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts (workstations, servers, virtual machines, mobile devices).
  • Only use secure networks and avoid using public Wi-Fi Consider installing and using a virtual private network (VPN).
  • Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
  • Disable hyperlinks in received emails.

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